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water code, specifically made applicable to the appropriation of
groundwater, and therefore inapplicable.
Legislative intent based on statutory interpretation requires that
the final certificate of water right be consistent with the beneficial use
requirements. A determination of beneficial use is based upon diversion and actual use. "Perfection" and "beneficial use" have the same
meaning under the applicable statutes, thereby limiting the appropriation to the actual use. This requirement effectuates legislative concerns about the availability of water resources given the ever increasing
demand an d eliminates speculation and uncertainty in the management of limited water resources.
John B. Ridgley

Hillis v. State Dept. of Ecology, 932 P.2d 139 (Wash. 1997) (holding
the use of watershed assessments and the prioritization of applications
for groundwater appropriations as within the department's statutory
authority).
Developers in Kittias County, Washington, Larry and Veralene Hillis, filed nine applications for groundwater appropriations with the
Department of Ecology ("Ecology") in 1992. After two years and no
response from Ecology, the developers sought a writ of mandamus in
superior court to compel Ecology to process their applications. The
trial court granted the writ, and Ecology appealed. On appeal, Ecology challenged the writ of mandamus, which demanded the immediate processing of the applications, the cessation of watershed assessments until Ecology had investigated and decided upon all
applications, and the court's holding that Ecology's decision to prioritize applications did not follow the APA procedures for rule making.
The Washington Supreme Court considered a few key circumstances when making its decision. Primarily, in 1993 the legislature severely cut Ecology's budget, causing them to implement some new priorities and decisions regarding the groundwater application backlog in
its office. In addition, the area for which the developers sought
groundwater rights already had nearly 1,000 applicants, some with seniority, and the area's drought created a water shortage for all involved.
In deciding whether to compel Ecology to immediately process the
Hillis' application and cease the watershed assessments, the court
looked at Ecology's statutory authority and whether it acted arbitrarily
and capriciously in making its decisions.
Ecology argued that the watershed assessments allowed them to
process applications more quickly than taking the applications one by
one and making decisions individually as it received them. Instead,
the department could group the applications by area, conduct a watershed assessment to determine the availability of water in the area, and
then decide on each application accordingly. Ecology also prioritized
applications by those for public health emergency use, public project
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short-term use, and changes to existing rights. The developers in this
case did not meet any of Ecology's priorities and many applications
were senior in priority to theirs. The Hillises argued that Ecology had
a statutory duty to process their application in a timely manner.
The court found no time limit in Ecology's governing statute, observed that agencies may not exceed legislative funding to perform its
duties, and stated that "[n]either Ecology's decisions to prioritize
emergency applications nor.., to batch applications by watershed are
arbitrary or capricious or beyond its statutory authority."
Ecology responded to the budget cuts appropriately, according to
the court. In developing the watershed assessment program, Ecology
petitioned and won an additional $500,000 in emergency funds from
Washington State. Once the decision to prioritize the applications by
emergency, short term and existing use evolved, the department notified applicants and the public through a series of publications.
In its holding, the court also noted that the public policy effect of
an immediate investigation of the developer's applications and a cessation of watershed assessments must be considered as well. If the court
compelled Ecology to act in accordance with the trial court's writ,
thousands of other applicants could petition for immediate investigation as well, exacerbating the department's backlog problem. In the
meantime, by forcing Ecology to cease the assessments, a backlog
would build as Ecology investigated each application as received.
"[Enforcing the writ] would put Ecology in the untenable position of
either violating a court order or violating the state constitution...
which forbid[s] agencies to expend any money in excess of the
amount appropriated .... " The court commented that the separation
of powers doctrine kept it from compelling the state legislature to give
Ecology the funds to process applications in a more timely manner.
Finally, the court also refused to violate other applicants' rights in order to process the Hillis' application first. "As Ecology correctly points
out, it cannot determine if there is water available for Hillis until it has
processed the senior applicants who seek water from the same source."
The supreme court did uphold the trial court's invalidation of
Ecology decisions for not following rule-making procedures in accordance with the APA. Hillis asserted, and the trial court found, that
Ecology's assessments and prioritization of applications were new
"qualifications and requirements" which "are invalid unless adopted in
compliance with the APA." Ecology argued that the changes did not
affect whether an application met water rights criteria. The supreme
court countered that while the criteria for granting water rights went
unchanged, prerequisites to those decisions must follow APA rule
making procedures that give applicants and the public a right to notice and comment. The court held the changes invalid for the above
reasons, and it noted that Ecology could continue with the watershed
assessments, but could not make any decisions based on the assessments until it followed APA procedures for rule making. In the meantime, Ecology could adopt "temporary emergency rules" to keep the
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application process streamlined "while regular rule making proceeds."
JenniferLee

State of Washington, Dep't of Ecology v. Acquavella, 935 P.2d 595
(Wash. 1997) (holding that confirmation of a water right must be
made upon a finding of beneficial use; an appropriate measure of an
irrigation district's water right is the acres of irrigable land to which
the water right is appurtenant; and, that classification of a water right
as either standby or reserve cannot serve to protect it from future challenges of non-use).
This direct appeal arose from a general adjudication of water
rights in the Yakima River Basin and the trial court's water award to
one of many claimants, the Yakima-Tieton Irrigation District ('YrID").
Formed in 1918, the YTID received its water from reservoirs constructed and maintained by the United States pursuant to the Reclamation Act. Under a 1945 Consent Decree, the YTID's primary water
right was listed as 96,000 acre-feet for annual use during the irrigation
season. Pursuant to amendments to YTID's contract with the Bureau
of Reclamation, YTID was granted another 18,000 acre-feet in low water years. This grant was based upon the condition that the additional
entitlement did not exceed the safe carrying capacity of YTID's canals.
Due to this condition, however, YTID has never been able to accept
the additional 18,000 acre-feet. The trial court classified YTID as a major claimant with state-based water rights and determined that YTID
could carry 110,700 acre feet safely in its canals and awarded that
amount to YTID for the irrigation season. The trial court entered a
finding of fact and order with this water entitlement describing YTID's
water right as being appurtenant to 27,900 irrigable acres. The trial
court stated that YTID's "current irrigable acreage is subject to change
based on future reclassification of the Bureau of Reclamation." Two
assignments of error as to the classification of acreage were raised as
issues for review.
First, YTID argued that 18,000 acre-feet of the amount awarded
should have been classified specifically as standby/reserve water. Second, YTID challenged the appropriateness of the statement concerning the Bureau of Reclamation's reclassification of irrigable acres
within YTID. Additionally, the Department of Ecology ("DOE"), crossappellant, challenged the trial court with two issues of appeal. First,
DOE challenged the trial court's reliance on the 1945 Consent Decree
as evidence of YTID's water right. DOE asserted that any water right
must be based on actual, past beneficial use of the water. Second,
DOE asserted that the trial court erred in using the irrigable acres
category instead of the actual irrigated acres category. DOE alleged
that YTID's water right should be limited by the number of actual acres
previously irrigated.

